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KEEPING PACE:
A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE ETHICAL USE OF
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

Kay Ely-Pierce

"We have met the enemy and he is us."
Pogo
Advances in health care technology have forged a mighty sword in the
ongoing battle against illness and death. That sword, however, is doubleedged and unfortunately has not been presented with guidance for its
judicious use. Our health care system provides the technological power to
prolong life, or perhaps more accurately to "sustain bodily functions"
indefinitely,316 yet it has not compelled us, as a society, to seriously ask,
"should we?" And, if we should, "when and for whom, and under what
circumstances?" This is the ethical legacy of health care in the 20th
century. There is but a short time to amend that legacy and promote a
logical, reasoned and fair use of technologies, grounded in distributive
justice for the 21st century.

WHO SHALL DECIDE?

Traditionally, the responsibility for deciding what was "best" for the
patient fell to the physician alone. 317 Today, health care teams, who
witness the inequities in the present system every day, including the fiscal
and human costs, and the benefits of advanced technology use, bear the
responsibility for deciding. Tomorrow, health care teams will bear
responsibility, not for deciding, but for asking how to best distribute
technology use, and for providing society with the information necessary
to formulate an answer.
We as a society must be prepared to use this information to determine
who should be the recipient of any given technology at any given time and
for any purpose. We have abdicated that responsibility in the past, first to
the physician, then to the health care team. Yet now, we cry "foul" when
316

GEORGE P. SMITH, II, LEGAL AND HEALTHCARE ETHICS FOR THE ELDERLY 107

(1996).
317

DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND

BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING 1-4 (1991).
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physicians act paternalistically. Paternalism is a natural outgrowth of
318
beneficence run amok.
Society should not demand that the physician
give up this role without being ready to take up the mantle.
Consider the following: a 67-year-old male (0 negative blood type) is
admitted to the intensive care unit for end stage liver failure. Secondary to
his liver failure, he has developed renal failure. He is in a metabolic coma
because of the inability of his liver and kidneys to clear toxins, which
consequently affect the brain. As a further complication, he has developed
bleeding, necessitating blood product transfusions. The patient is critical
and "critical illness stimulates heroic efforts at rescue." 3 19 Currently, the
most common approach to such a patient is to "go all out" 320 -- put the
patient on continuous dialysis to clear toxins; use intravenous, oral and
rectal medications to maintain blood pressure and balance body
electrolytes; give blood products to compensate for blood loss and to
reestablish clotting; and place the patient on the liver transplant waiting
list. How long should the patient be maintained in this state? Does it
matter if he has insurance? Are there other costs beyond the mounting
financial costs?
Consider these additional facts: this patient filled the last available bed
in the ICU. The patient's blood type (0 negative) is rare and difficult to
obtain, and the blood bank has only very limited stores to serve the entire
hospital, including the emergency department. Additionally, the patient is
a chronic alcoholic who had been hospitalized numerous times before for
alcohol related pathologies. Do these factors make a difference? Would it
influence the decision to know that a 26-year-old father of two who has 0
negative blood has been injured in a hit-and-run automobile accident and
needs both 0 negative blood and immediate admittance to the ICU?

RATIONING

The time to make these decisions is not when the patient is
hospitalized. It is now. We must develop a framework for analyzing the
costs and benefits of given treatments for different categories of patients.
Is this rationing? Perhaps. Is that bad? Not necessarily. In fact,
etymologically, the word ration derives from the Latin for "a

3 18

TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 264

(4th ed. 1994).
319 Is the Cost of Terminal Care Treatment the Issue?, DRUGS & THERAPY

PERSP.,

May

26, 1997, at 14, 14.
320

See Robert M. Kaplan & Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Healthcare Resource

Consumption in Terminal Care, PHARMOECONOMICS 11 (1997) (discussing the cost of

terminal care and high techonology interventions and implications for determinations of
futility).
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reckoning," 32 1 which may be defined as "a measuring of possibilities for
the future." 322 Rationing is a necessity in order to provide the greatest
good to the greatest number in a health care system that does not currently
provide for all people equitably. The word ration however, has taken on
pejorative connotations in the field of health care. This is partially because
of its association with Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG's), the limitations
on admissions to and length of stay in hospitals by Managed Care
Organizations and insurance companies, and perhaps more 323
basically,
medicine."
"socialized
of
idea
the
with
because of its association
DRG's were an attempt by the federal government to solve the
problems of overuse of technology and runaway costs in programs such as
Medicare. However, a study published by Johns Hopkins University found
that the DRG system did not account for inter-hospital differences in
distribution of illness severity, resulting in discrimination against certain
hospitals and patients. 324 "DRG's encourage a form of 'implicit rationing'
in ICU's by pressuring physicians to alter, withhold, or withdraw
expensive care and encourage hospitals to limit or reduce the number of
325
beds in existing ICU's."
DRGs create more inequity in an already inequitable system because
they seek to treat the symptoms of a failing health care system (i.e.
runaway technology and uncontrolled costs), not the underlying cause the failure of our system to utilize the principles of distributive justice to
decide on the use of technology.
Because DRG's have had such a negative impact on our health care
delivery, many have adopted the stance that rationing is per se untenable.
It is regrettable that rationing has acquired such a negative meaning, when
its true meaning applies so well to proper health care maintenance. Many
authors use the term "allocation of resources," but this refers to
distribution; it does not imply any shortages of resources. 326 In reality, we
are facing these types of shortages. In some cases, real shortages exist,
such as the limited supply of organs for transplant. 327 In other cases, the
cost of technological interventions produces a de facto shortage of
resources, which makes medical interventions inaccessible to the poor
321 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1179 (2d
322

Id.

at

1186;

see

Julie

Rovner,

ed.).
Micromanaged
Care,

http://www.betweenrounds.po.com/ issuel/monitor (visited Mar. 31, 1998).

323 See Rovner, supra note 7 (citing a number of bills presented and pending in Congress
which are seen as part of a "backlash" against managed care dictates on length of stay,
coverage, and treatment).
324 RUTH MACKLIN, MORTAL CHOICES: BIOETHICS 1N TODAY'S WORLD 161 (1987).
325

Id. at 162.

326 JUDITH WILSON ROSS, HANDBOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 23 (1986).

327 Dept. of Health Hum. Serv., Fiscal Rep. to Cong.: The Status of Organ Donation and
Coordination Services 27 (1987).
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and/or uninsured. For example, the drugs used in the treatment of AIDS
may cost thousands of dollars, precluding their use by the poor. 328 The
329
Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, (HIPAA)
when originally proposed as the Kennedy - Kassebaum Bill, 330 envisioned
creating equity via universal health care coverage. Although originally
intended as a universal-access health care plan centered around managed
care, HIPAA, as passed, does not extend coverage to the uninsured. While
it does prohibit insurance companies from refusing 33to1 renew coverage,
HIPPA sets no limits on the amount they may charge.
The state of Oregon attempted to address inequities in the provision of
health care and implemented a state health care plan on February 1, 1994
which rations services based on a list of 709 medical procedures. Those
below number 587 are considered to be least beneficial and are, therefore,
not covered by the insurance plan. 332 The plan has been criticized because
it categorizes patients based on procedures, 333
while not accounting for other
factors which affect outcomes and benefits.
Solutions such as DRGs and the Oregon plan address the symptoms of
a failing health care system: skyrocketing costs and inequitable
distribution of services, not the underlying pathology. In order to find the
solution, we must focus our efforts on the true root of the problem.
Society must acknowledge what health care practitioners already know.
334
Our present health care delivery system is inequitable and inconsistent.
We must be prepared to face the reality of rationing. Calling it by any
other name obscures the truth and limits our ability to solve the problem.

THE PROBLEM -- AN OUTDATED MORAL IMPERATIVE

328

Leslie Gevirtz,

Three Drugs Better Than Two

in Fighting HIV-Studies,

http://www.aegis.com/aegis/news/re/re1997/RE70903.html (visited Apr. 16, 1998).
329 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1006, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1988.

330 Senator Edward Kennedy, Remarks at the Signing of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (Aug, 21, 1996).

Senator Kennedy spoke of the

limitations of the bill, as passed. The bill was sponsored by Senators Edward Kennedy
(Mass.) and Nancy Kasselbaum (Kan.).
331 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, supra note 14.
332 See Thomas Bodenheimer, The Oregon Health Plan-Lessonsfor the Nation (Firstof
Two Parts), 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 651 (1997); William M. Bennett, The Oregon
Medicaid Controversy, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 642-43 (1992).

333 Michael H. Shapiro & Roy G. Spece, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS ON
BIOETHICS LAW 307-08 (Supp. 1991) (criticisms were aimed at the precursor to the law
as enacted in 1994. Many of the criticisms however, are still valid).
334 See Christine Kuehn Kelly, Patient-Centered Ethics Reclaiming Center Stage,
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED., Aug. 15, 1997, at 1-45, 1-45.
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The problem is the current moral imperative in American society - that
life is sacred and death is the enemy. This imperative has not kept pace
with technological advances in health care. We must either change our
moral imperative or withdraw the technology. To withdraw technology
across the board would be foolish. What is necessary is to manage our
technology in a manner consistent with a new imperative. The new
imperative must be that life is sacred and death is a natural and respected
part of life. Death then becomes the dignified exit of a peaceful person
society that is not torn by the idea of a biologic
from a helpful
335
transition.
There is a movement toward acknowledging, if not accepting, this
philosophic principle. This is evidenced by recent attention to advance
directives, do-not-resuscitate orders (DNRs), federal enactment of the
Patient Self Determination Act, 336 the failure of the Michigan courts to
successfully prosecute the infamous Dr. Kevorkian, 3 37 and the rise in
Hospice. 338 In theory, these should indicate a society on the verge of
accepting death as a transition - a stage in the process of living. In
practice, however, they often fail to achieve their objective.
Advance directives are, as the name implies, a directive on the use of
technological interventions (specifically, those aimed at prolonging life)
which a patient sets forth in anticipation of the day when the patient may
be incapable of making her wishes known. 339 Under the Patient Self
Determination Act (PSDA), the federal government now requires all
hospitals receiving funds or services from either Medicare or Medicaid to
provide adult patients with information on advance directives regarding
termination of life support, to ask all patients if an advance directive has
been executed, to document the answer, and to provide the patient with
information on state laws regarding advance directives. 34 In reality, only
335 James E. George, ed., DNR Orders, Living Wills, and Advance Directives:
The

Emergency Physician's Perspective, Emergency Physician Legal Bull. (Emergency
Physician Associates, P.A., Woodbury, J.D.) 1991, at 1, 1.
336 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (1990)).
337 As of August 1997, prosecutors have failed in their attempts to have an indictment
issued against Dr. Kevorkian, a retired pathologist, for his practice of providing the
means to accomplish suicide to patients he believes need his assistance.
338 See generally What is Hospice?, http://www.hospicefoundation.org/page2.htm
(visited Apr. 16, 1998); The Hospice Alliance Advantage ... Because Every Moment
Counts, http://www.hospice-alliance.com (visited Apr. 16, 1998).
Hospice is a
movement which began in the 1960s when Dr. (Dame) Cicely Saunders established St.
Christopher's Hospice near London, England. Hospice is founded on the belief that
healing a person does not always mean curing a disease. It promotes pain control and

compassionate care in a variety of settings.
339 See, e.g., Joan M. Teno et al., Do Formal Advance Directives Affect Resuscitation
Decisions and the Use of Resourcesfor Seriously Ill Patients?,5 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 23,
29 n.1 (1994).
340 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, supra note 21.
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between nine 341 and twenty-eight percent 342 of patients execute advance

directives and often 343
those are countermanded by family members or
health care providers.

DNR orders may work in conjunction with advance directives or may
exist independently of any such directive. A DNR order allows the patient
the option to refuse resuscitation. In the event that the patient is incapable
of making that decision, a "surrogate decisionmaker" will decide on behalf
of the patient, based upon what the surrogate thinks the patient would
want. 34 The underlying rationale for a DNR order is that in many cases,
efforts at resuscitation would be not only futile, but would prevent the
patient from experiencing a dignified death.345
DNR orders are cited as a particularly fitting measure of the respect
health care providers should accord those patients whose condition has
come to a point where the processes of dying are beginning to overtake
the processes of living . . . [and where] artificial intervention in the

prolongation of the patient's life would be considered cruel and inhuman
punishment rather than a help. 346 Studies indicate, however, that DNR
orders are often overlooked or ignored and resuscitation efforts proceed
regardless. 347 For example, in a survey reported in the nursing journal RN,
six in ten of the survey respondents [nurses] reported having participated
in resuscitation efforts they considered senseless or hopeless within the
year preceding the survey.
The legislative enactment of Natural Death Acts 349 shows an
encouraging indicator that a segment of society has begun to accept death
as a natural part of life. As an example, Virginia's Health Care Decisions
Act 350 defines a life-prolonging procedure as any medical procedure,
341

Smith, supra note 1, at 55.

342 Teno, supra note 24, at 23.
343 See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); Bartling v. Super. Ct. of L.A.

County, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 228 Cal.
Rptr. 847 (1986).
344 See, e.g., Health Care Decisions Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983 (Michie
1994 &
Supp. 1997).
345 RAYMOND

J.

DEVETTERE, PRACTICAL DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS

199-207(1995).
346 George, supra note 20.
347

348

See Is the Cost of Terminal Care Treatment the Issue?, supra note 4, at 14.
David Anderson, Death and Dying: Ethics at the End of Life, RN, Oct. 1988, at 42,

42. Specifically, nurses gave the following examples: (1) "A patient who had been in a
coma for 8 years [who] began to have GI bleeding and was given pint after pint of
blood." (2) "An 81 year old man with cancer metastases to the brain [who] came to the
ED with a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm and they repaired it." (3) "A patient with
end stage AIDS [who] received multiple resuscitations." Id.
349 The Virginia Natural Death Act was subsumed by the Health Care Decisions Act
effective July 1, 1992. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2981 (Michie 1994).
350 Id.
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treatment or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artificial
means to sustain, restore or supplant a spontaneous vital function, or
which otherwise affords no reasonable expectation of recovery, or which
serves only to prolong dying. 351 It includes artificially administered
hydration and nutrition. 352 It explicitly states that nothing in the Act shall
prohibit the administration of medication or performance of any medical
procedure to provide comfort or alleviate pain, including
the
353
administration of excess dosages of pain relieving medications.
The implication is that futile interventions are wasteful and unjust,
death is "natural," and dignity (e.g., pain relief, compassionate care)
should be accorded to all. However, the United States Supreme Court has
refused to find a constitutional right to physician assisted suicide 354 and
states may therefore criminalize an act which may be ethically supportable
as compassionate care.
Society apparently seeks to support the patient's right to autonomy yet
balks when the exercise of that right threatens the moral imperative that
death is the enemy. Too often, patients are directed to be brave, tough it
out and not take the easy way out: "do not go gentle into that good
night. 3 55 Families regularly override the stated preferences of patients
that no heroic measures are instituted,3 56 insisting that everything be done.
As long as death is seen as the enemy, it is the antithesis of living.
Only when death is seen as a stage in the process of living is there no
longer the need to attempt to refute death. One may, at once, live and die.
This is the premise of the hospice movement. Hospice is perhaps the most
encouraging indicator that society may actually embrace a new
imperative.
The Hospice movement began in the 1960's when Dame Cicely
Saunders founded St. Christopher's Hospice near London.35 7 The term
hospice derives from the Latin hospitum, meaning guesthouse, and was, in
medieval times, used to describe a place of shelter and rest for weary or
sick travelers returning from religious pilgrimages. 358 The term was later
applied to those places where wounded Crusaders could rest and receive
351 Id.
352 Id.

353 Id.

This implicates the bioethical principle of "double effect." See BEAUCHAMP,
supra note 3, at 206-11.
354 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
355 Dylan Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night, in COLLECTED POEMS 129,
129 (1957).
356

Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, HASTINGS

CENTER REPORT,

July-

Aug. 1991, at23, 23.
357 See What is Hospice?, supra note 23.
3 58

Id.
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treatment. 359 The
modern terms hospital and hospitality similarly derive
360
hospitum.
from
The Hospice foundation of America defines hospice as "not a place to
go to die, but rather a concept of care based on the promise that when
medical science can no longer add days to life, more life will be added to
each day." 36 1 Hospice utilizes the concept of palliative care, by providing
pain control and other necessary comfort care measures. Artificial lifesupport measures and heroic medical and surgical interventions are not
employed in hospice. 362 Unfortunately, significant barriers to entering
hospice exist. These barriers range from geographic unavailability,
through the difficulty which physicians face in certifying that the patient
has less than six months to live (a requirement for hospice care), to the
363
necessary ideologic shift from acute care treatments to palliative care.
These barriers are not, however, insurmountable.
Once we have truly accepted the new imperative, then we may
acknowledge the inequities and inconsistencies in our treatment because
we have operated under the old imperative. Then, our technologies can be
applied in a more just fashion.

CRITERIA FOR THE RATIONING OF TECHNOLOGIES

Returning to the hypothetical situation of the death of either the 67year-old alcoholic with liver failure or the 26-year-old hit-and-run victim
is not intrinsically "bad." Under the facts given, the hit-and-run victim has
the better long-term prognosis if he can be managed through the present
crisis. He has no underlying pathology. The 67-year-old patient, however,
has underlying liver disease which will necessitate a transplant, for which
he is not a candidate because of current active alcohol abuse. These are
prognoses. 364 Prognosis should be one factor in the process of deciding
who should receive the resources available (in this case, the 0 negative
blood and the ICU bed).
The other factor in this hypothetical scenario which must be
considered concerns the nature of the situation. That is, is the patient's
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Id.
362 Id.

Diane E. Meier et al., Improving Palliative Care, 127 ANNALs OF INTERNAL
Aug. 1, 1997, at 225-30, 225.
363

364

MED.,

Plural for prognosis (from the Greek prognosis meaning foreknowledge); a forecast as

to the probable outcome of an attack of disease; the prospect as to recovery from a
disease as indicated by the nature and symptoms of the case. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1262 (28th ed. 1994).
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present condition one that will be rendered temporary by the intervention
of technology, or is the condition one which will remain permanent,
regardless of intervention? In the cases presented, the accident victim's
condition will be rendered temporary (assuming no other medically
relevant factors), while the other patient's underlying condition (liver
failure secondary to alcoholic cirrhosis) will not change through
intervention.
Thus, two of the criteria which should be used in health care are
prognosis and duration (i.e., temporariness) of condition. Another
criterion which has been proposed by some and, in at least one case, put
into practice is "social worth." This is a type of merit determination. The
case in point took place in the early 1960s at the Seattle Artificial Kidney
Center in Seattle, Washington. Dialysis was new and extremely
expensive, and the center created a committee to decide the most
appropriate applicants for dialysis. The decision was based upon a number
of factors including age, sex, marital status, number of dependents,
income, net worth, emotional stability, educational background,
365
occupation, past performance, future potential and personal references.
Viewing the criteria used by the Seattle dialysis center, such merit
considerations seem harsh and have
in fact been dismissed by some
366
repugnant."
"morally
as
bioethicists
A teleological approach, especially the utilitarian consequentialist
position as found in the writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill,
would seem to support the use of some type of merit system. 367 The
outcome of "the greatest good for the greatest number" determines the
choices. Although such considerations are a "slippery slope," they are
valid considerations. In our hypothetical situation, would it make a
difference in the decision as to who would receive the blood and ICU bed
if the terminal 67 year old was in fact a scientist who was within days of
discovering a cure for cancer or a vaccine for HIV? This would make a
difference under the utilitarian consequentialist theory because prolonging
the life of the one (the patient/scientist), the many (all those having cancer
or at risk of acquiring HIV) would benefit. Obviously, such a hypothetical
assumes that the patient will regain his productivity and no other person
involved in the research could carry on in his stead.

365 See Macklin, supra note 9, at 159-60 (citing Richard A. Rettig, The Policy Debate
on
Patient Care Financing for Victims of End-Stage Renal Disease, 40 JOUR. L. &

CONTEMP.
PROBS. 196, 220-22 (1976).
366
See id. at 160.
367 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 47-48 (describing
theory of

consequentialism as adhering to the belief that the rightness or wrongness of an act is
determined by its consequences, and utilitarianism as a theory that we ought always to do
that which produces the most overall positive outcome).
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A teleological (utilitarian consequentialist) perspective would take
merit into consideration. However, the factors to be considered in
determinations of merit must be outlined in a careful and ethicallysupportable manner. Clearly, considerations such as income and net worth
have no place in the decision process. But, what of the many other factors
which may be considered? We as a society must decide what we will
accept as meritorious. Should age be a factor? Urgency? Social Usefulness
of the patient? Social responsibilities and dependents of the patient?368
We are presented with a schema, then, where health care providers
stand in the middle of a two-way street. They provide to the society the
facts about prognosis of a given condition with and without technological
intervention. They provide facts on the costs and benefits of a given
technology. They provide guidance based upon experience with previous
similar situations and their outcomes (casuistry). 369 But society has a duty
to provide the ethical framework which will allow the patient, the patient's
family, and the health care team to make a just distribution of resources.

THE ANSWER

The answer is really a question. How will we address the dilemma
posed by 20th century technology operating within a system whose basic
tenet -- that death is an inexorable enemy -- no longer applies? The

question is the answer. We must open a dialogue, confront the issues,
question ourselves. We must question whether it is not time to change our
moral imperative. I believe it is. We must leave behind the concept that
death is the enemy to be vanquished. Arnold Beissser, M.D. expressed it
much more eloquently than I when he wrote that "death is no more a
defeat than is growing taller, starting school, or falling in love. All are
phases of life, and each brings a special set of hazards and
satisfactions."' 370 Once we have truly accepted this, then there will be no
need to fight death in every situation.
Our challenge does not come in determining when to utilize our
technologies to forestall death, but instead to substitute the principles of
hospice. It is then that we may, in good conscience, begin the process of
rationing our health care technologies. My position is that we must begin
to set out our criteria for making these decisions now. Considerations of
368

See generally FRANCES MYRNA KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY 201-334 (1993)

(discussing distribution of resources).
369 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 92.
370 ARNOLD R. BEISSER, A GRACEFUL PASSAGE: NOTES

ON THE FREEDOM TO LIVE OR

DIE xiv (1992). Dr. Beisser was stricken with polio at the age of twenty-five as a young
surgery resident. He is paralyzed from the neck down and spends approximately half of

each day in an iron lung. He is a clinical professor of psychiatry at UCLA and has
written extensively.
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prognosis, temporariness of affliction and merit must be undertaken.
Society must decide on explicit criteria to be considered in determining
merit. Without such an explicit framework, we are in the position of
making ad hoc decisions which perpetuate the inequity and inconsistency
of our present system.
This very problem was exposed in the 1960s when the ethically
insupportable decision-making process of the Seattle Artificial Kidney
Center selection committee was brought to light. Referring to that
situation (specifically the determinations regarding social worth), an
observation was made that, "[i]f no understandable criteria of social worth
can be agreed upon, committees measuring social worth must decide upon
an ad hoc basis. Ad hockery is not the stuff from which 'the
constitutional
371
guaranties of equal protection and due process are made."
If we can accept a new moral imperative, acknowledge the need to
ration technology use and begin the process of explicitly stating what
criteria we, as a society, will sanction for allocation decisions, we will
take into the 21st century, perhaps not the answer, but at least the
framework for developing the answer. If we can do that, then the ethical
legacy of the 20th century will be that of a people who strove toward
justice.

371

Shapiro & Spece, supra note 18, at 834 (citing David Sanders & Jesse Dukeminier,

Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 357 (1968)).
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